Security and verification

ZK.

Plonky3 STARKs over the KoalaBear field (2^31 − 2^24 + 1). Poseidon2 + FRI. No trusted setup.

STATUS: Testnet
CRATE: tenzro-zk
STABILITY: Stable
REFERENCE: Plonky3

Why STARKs

Transparent setup (no ceremony), post-quantum-conjectured soundness, ~64–128 KB proofs that verify in ~5–20 ms on commodity hardware.

Pinned config

log_blowup    1
num_queries   64
query_pow     16
commit_pow    8
p3 git rev    32079474b1d31d9221656ae774afb322d2597db0

AIRs

Three concrete AIRs: inference, settlement, identity. verify_proof_envelope(&Proof) dispatches by circuit_id.

Commitment model

Validators verify Plonky3 proofs off-EVM and publish the proof to the DA layer. A 32-byte SHA-256 commitment is admitted to the ZkCommitmentRegistry only under a 2f+1 stake-weight quorum certificate — each co-signer independently re-verifies the proof and BLS-signs the commitment. The EVM ZK_VERIFY precompile is an O(1) HashSet lookup against that registry.

Fraud window

Each attested commitment stays challengeable for 256 finalized blocks. Any staked party can file a fraud proof (tenzro_fileZkFraudProof); the node fetches the proof from its DA locator and re-runs the verifier. If it fails, the commitment is retracted and every co-signer on the certificate is slashed. Read the window record with tenzro_getZkAttestation.

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